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Abstract—Privacy-preserving data publishing is to protect
sensitive information of individuals in published data while
the distortion ratio of the data is minimized. One well-studied
approach is the k-anonymity model. Recently, several authors
have recognized that k-anonymity cannot prevent attribute
disclosure. To address this privacy threat, one solution would
be to employ p-sensitive k-anonymity, a novel paradigm in
relational data privacy, which prevents sensitive attribute
disclosure. p-sensitive k-anonymity partitions the data into
groups of records such that each group has at least p distinct
sensitive values. Existing approaches for achieving p-sensitive
k-anonymity are mostly generalization-based. In this paper, we
propose a novel permutation-based approach called anatomy
to release the quasi-identifier and sensitive values directly in
two separate tables. Combined with a grouping mechanism,
this approach not only protects privacy, but captures a large
amount of correlation in the microdata. We develop a top-down
algorithm for computing anatomized tables that obey the p-
sensitive k-anonymity privacy requirement, and minimize the
error of reconstructing the microdata. Extensive experiments
confirm that anatomy allows significantly more effective data
analysis than the conventional publication methods based on
generalization.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of privacy-preserving data publishing has
received a lot of attention in recent years. Privacy preserva-
tion on relational data has been studied extensively. A major
category of privacy attacks on relational data is to re-identify
individuals by joining a published table containing sensitive
information with some external tables modeling background
knowledge of attackers. Most of existing work is formulated
in the following context: several organizations, such as
hospitals, publish detailed data (also called microdata) about
individuals (e.g. medical records) for research or statistical
purposes.
Privacy risks of publishing microdata are well-known. Fa-
mous attacks include de-anonymisation of the Massachusetts
hospital discharge database by joining it with a public
voter database [10] and privacy breaches caused by AOL
search data [3]. Even if identifiers such as names and social
security numbers have been removed, the adversary can
use linking [9], homogeneity and background attacks [5],
[11], [12] to re-identify individual data records or sensitive
information of individuals. To overcome the re-identification
attacks, the mechanism of k-anonymity was proposed [8],
[9]. Specifically, a data set is said to be k-anonymous
(k  1) if, on the quasi-identifier (QI) attributes (that is,
the maximal set of join attributes to re-identify individual
records), each record is identical with at least (k  1) other
records. The larger the value of k, the better the privacy is
protected.
Although k-anonymity has been well adopted, Traian et
al. [11], [12] showed that a k-anonymous table may still
have some subtle but severe privacy problems due to the
lack of diversity in the sensitive attributes. In particular,
they showed that, the degree of privacy protection does
not really depend on the size of the QI-groups, which
contain tuples that are identical on those attributes. Instead,
it is determined by the number of the distinct sensitive
values associated with each equivalence class. To overcome
the weakness in k-anonymity, they proposed the notion of
p-sensitive k-anonymity. Its purpose is to protect against
attribute disclosure by requiring that there be at least p
different values for each sensitive attribute within the records
sharing a combination of QI attributes. For instance, Table
II is a 2-sensitive 2-anonymous view of Table I since in each
QI-group, there are at least two distinct Disease values.
The main approaches used to achieve anonymity in the
previous work are based on generalization or suppression
[9], [4], [5], which assumes that each attribute has a corre-
sponding conceptual generalization hierarchy or taxonomy
tree. A lower level domain in the hierarchy provides more
details than a higher level domain. For example, Zip Code
4350 is a lower level domain and Zip Code 435 is a higher
level domain. Such hierarchies are suitable for numerical
attributes as well. In particular, a hierarchical structure is
2009 IEEE International Conference on e-Business Engineering
978-0-7695-3842-6/09 $26.00 © 2009 Crown Copyright
DOI 10.1109/ICEBE.2009.34
199
Authorized licensed use limited to: UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN QUEENSLAND. Downloaded on August 14,2010 at 08:20:50 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
Job Age Sex Zip Code Disease
clerk 23 M 1100 HIV
manager 37 M 2300 Fever
clerk 61 F 3400 Flu
worker 69 F 4350 HIV
worker 41 M 4435 Flu
technician 58 M 5340 Fever
Table I: Original medical data
Job Age Sex Zip Code Disease
* [20-60] M [1000-6000] HIV
* [20-60] M [1000-6000] Fever
* [61-70] F [1000-6000] Flu
* [61-70] F [1000-6000] HIV
* [20-60] M [1000-6000] Flu
* [20-60] M [1000-6000] Fever
Table II: 2-sensitive 2-anonymous table


















Figure 1: 2D visualization of original and generalized data
in Age-Zip code plane.
defined as fvalue, interval, g, where value is the raw
numerical data, interval is the range of the raw data and 
is a symbol representing any values. Generalization replaces
lower level domain values with higher level domain values.
For example, the attribute value of Age 23 in Table I is
generalized to the interval [20-60] in Table II.
A. Defects of generalization schema
Although generalization preserves privacy, it often loses
considerable information in the microdata, which severely
compromises the accuracy of data analysis. Assume that the
Table II was released, and that a researcher wants to derive
from this table an estimate for the following query:
A: SELECT COUNT(*) FROM medical data
WHERE Disease=’fever’ AND Age  40 AND Zip Code IN [1000-
2000]
To illustrate how to process the query, Figure 1 shows a
2D space, where the x-, y-dimensions are Age and Zip Code,
respectively. Each point denotes a tuple in the microdata of
Table I. For example, the x-, y-coordinates of point 1 equal
the age and Zip code of tuple 1, respectively. Rectangle
R1 (or R2) is obtained from the generalized values in the
first (or second) QI-group in Table II. For instance, the x-
(y-) projection of R1 is the generalized age [20, 60](Zip
code [1000, 6000]) of tuples 1,2,5,6. Query A is represented
as the shaded rectangle Q, whose projection on the x- (y-
) dimension is decided by the range condition Age  40
(1000<Zip code<2000).
Since the researcher sees only R1 and R2 (but not
the points), s/he answers query A in a way similar to
selectivity estimation on a multidimensional histogram [6],
as suggested in [4]. Clearly, as R2 is disjoint with Q, no
tuple in the second QI-group can satisfy the query. R1,
however, intersects Q, and hence, is examined as follows.
From the Disease in Table II, without additional knowledge,
the researcher assumes uniform data distribution in R1, and
computes probability p that a tuple in the QI-group qualifies
the range predicates of A as Area(R1\RQ)=Area(R1)=0.1.
This value leads to an approximate answer 0.2, which,
however, is five times smaller than actual query result 1.
The gross error is caused by the fact that the data
distribution in R1 significantly deviates from uniformity.
Nevertheless, given only the generalized table, we cannot
justify any other distribution assumption. This is an inherent
problem of generalization, which prevents an analyst from
correctly understanding the data distribution inside each QI-
group.
B. The anatomy approach
The idea of the anatomy approach is that if two tables
with a join attribute are published, the join of the two tables
can be lossy and this lossy join helps to conceal the private
information [15].
We could like to make use of this idea to derive a
new mechanism for achieving a privacy principle p-sensitive
k-anonymity. For example Table IV is a 2-sensitive 2-
anonymous view of Table III. From this table, we can gener-
ate a temporary table shown in Table V. For each QI-group
Q in the anonymized table, we assign a unique identifier
(ID) to Q and also to all tuples in Q. Then, we attach the
correspondence ID to each tuple in the original raw table
and form a new table temporary. From the temporary table,
we can generate two separate tables, Table VI and VIII.
The two tables share the attribute of Group ID. If we join
these two tables by the Group ID, it is easy to see that
the join is lossy and it is not possible to derive the Table
V after the join. The result of joining is shown in Table
X. From the anatomy, each sensitive value is linked to at
least 2 values. Therefore, the required individual privacy 2-
diversity is guaranteed (formal proof given in Section 4).
Also, in the joined table, for each individual, there are at
least 2 individuals that are linked to the same bag B of
sensitive values, such that in terms of the sensitive values,
they are not distinguishable. For example, the first record in
the original table (QI = (clerk, 1975, 4350)) is linked to bag
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Job Birth Zip Code Disease
clerk 1975 4350 HIV
manager 1955 4350 Flu
clerk 1955 5432 Flu
worker 1955 5432 Fever
worker 1975 4350 Flu
technician 1940 4350 Fever
Table III: Raw medical data
Job Birth Zip Code Disease
White-collar * 4350 HIV
White-collar * 4350 Flu
* 1955 5432 Flu
* 1955 5432 Fever
Blue-collar * 4350 Flu
Blue-collar * 4350 Fever
Table IV: 2-sensitive 2-anonymous table
Job Birth Zip Code Disease ID
clerk 1975 4350 HIV 1
manager 1955 4350 Flu 1
clerk 1955 5432 Flu 2
worker 1955 5432 Fever 2
worker 1975 4350 Flu 3
technician 1940 4350 Fever 3
Table V: Temporary table
B = fHIV; flug. We find that the second individual (QI =
(manager, 1955, 4350)) is also linked to the same bag B of
sensitive values. This is the goal of p-sensitive k-anonymity
for the protection of sensitive values.
C. Contribution and paper organization
[11] proposed to generate one generalized table which
satisfies p-sensitive k-anonymity by full domain gener-
alization. Due to the defects of generalization-based ap-
proach, we propose a novel permutation-based approach,
called “anatomy”, with which the privacy protection for
p-sensitive k-anonymity can be achieved by releasing the
quasi-identifier and sensitive values directly in two separate
tables. In the two tables, one table contains the undisturbed
non-sensitive values and the other table contains the undis-
turbed sensitive values. We show that the results are better
than previous approaches in the experiments.
The rest paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
introduce some basic concepts for privacy protection. In
Section 3, we discuss p-sensitive k-anonymity model and
illustrate how to anonymize the microdata with p-sensitive k-
anonymity requirement by the permutation-based approach.
We propose an efficient top-down algorithm for p-sensitive
k-anonymity with anatomy in Section 4. The extensive
experimental studies are included in Section 5. We conclude
the paper in Section 6.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Let T be the initial microdata table and T 0 be the released
microdata table. T 0 consists of a set of tuples over an
attribute set. The attributes characterizing microdata are
classified into the following three categories.
 Identifier attributes that can be used to identify a record
such as Name and Medicare card.
 Quasi-identifier (QI) attributes that may be known by
an intruder, such as Zip code and Age. QI attributes are
presented in the released microdata table T 0 as well as in
the initial microdata table T .
 Sensitive attributes that are assumed to be unknown to an
intruder and need to be protected, such as Health Condition
or ICD9Code 1. Sensitive attributes are presented both in T
and T 0.
1available at http://www.icd9code.com/
In what follows we assume that the identifier attributes
have been removed and the quasi-identifier and sensitive at-
tributes are usually kept in the released and initial microdata
table. Another assumption is that the value for the sensitive
attributes are not available from any external source. This
assumption guarantees that an intruder can not use the
sensitive attributes to increase the chances of disclosure.
Unfortunately, an intruder may use record linkage techniques
[13] between quasi-identifier attributes and external available
information to glean the identity of individuals from the
modified microdata. To avoid this possibility of privacy dis-
closure, one frequently used solution is to modify the initial
microdata, more specifically the quasi-identifier attributes
values, in order to enforce the k-anonymity property.
Definition 1 (Quasi-Identifier): A quasi-identifier (QI) is
a minimal set Q of attributes in microdata table T that can
be joined with external information to re-identify individual
records (with sufficiently high probability).
Definition 2 (k-anonymity): The modified microdata ta-
ble T 0 is said to satisfy k-anonymity if and only if each
combination of quasi-identifier attributes in T 0 occurs at least
k times.
A QI-group in the modified microdata T 0 is the set of all
records in the table containing identical values for the QI
attributes. There is no consensus in the literature over the
term used to denote a QI-group. This term was not defined
when k-anonymity was introduced [7], [10]. More recent
papers use different terminologies such as equivalence class
[14] and QI-cluster [11], [12].
For example, let the set fJob, Birth, Zip Codeg be the
quasi-identifier of Table III. Table IV is one 2-anonymous
view of Table III since there are two QI-groups and the size
of each QI-group is at least 2. So k-anonymity can ensure
that even though an intruder knows a particular individual
is in the k-anonymous microdata table T , s/he can not infer
which record in T corresponds to the individual with a
probability greater than 1=k.
III. p-SENSITIVE k-ANONYMITY WITH ANATOMY
Let us re-examine the objectives of p-sensitive k-
anonymity. With k-anonymity, we want to make sure that
when an individual is mapped to some sensitive values, at
least k   1 other individuals are also mapped to the same
sensitive values. With p-sensitive, we want to make sure
that the diversity of the sensitive values is at least p. For
example, consider an individual with (clerk, 1975, 4350) in
201
Authorized licensed use limited to: UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN QUEENSLAND. Downloaded on August 14,2010 at 08:20:50 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
Job Birth Zip Code Group ID
clerk 1975 4350 1
manager 1955 4350 1
clerk 1955 5432 2
worker 1955 5432 2
worker 1975 4350 3
technician 1940 4350 3
Table VI: Non-sensitive table (NSS)
Original QI values Group ID








Table VIII: Sensitive table (SS)
Group ID Sensitive attributes
Table IX: SS table
Job Birth Zip Code Disease Group ID
clerk 1975 4350 HIV 1
manager 1955 4350 HIV 1
clerk 1975 4350 Flu 1
manager 1955 4350 Flu 1
clerk 1955 5432 Flu 2
worker 1955 5432 Flu 2
clerk 1955 5432 Fever 2
worker 1955 5432 Fever 2
worker 1975 4350 Flu 3
technician 1940 4350 Flu 3
worker 1975 4350 Fever 3
technician 1940 4350 Fever 3
Table X: Resulting join table
Table III, with 2-sensitive 2-anonymity property, since s/he
is mapped to the first and the second tuple in Table IV, and
the diseases are mapped into the same bag B=fHIV, Flug.
There is another individual with (manager, 1955, 4350) in
Table III that is mapped to the same bag B as well. The p-
sensitive k-anonymity property ensures that at least p distinct
values exist in each sensitive values set B. For instance, with
p = 2; k = 2, B contains HIV and Flu. Based on this, we
give out the definition of p-sensitive k-anonymity as follows:
Definition 3 (p-sensitive k-anonymity): The modified mi-
crodata table T 0 satisfies p-sensitive k-anonymity property
if it satisfies k-anonymity, and for each QI-group in T 0, the
number of distinct values for each sensitive attribute occurs
at least p times within the same QI-group.
Suppose we form an anonymous table in which some
Quasi-identifier(QI) values are generalized. As we discussed
before, in the anonymous table, each set of tuples with
the same QI values forms a QI-group. However, instead of
publishing one single table T with the generalized values,
there is the possibility of separating the sensitive attribute
from the non-sensitive attributes and generate two tables by
projecting these two sets of attributes. Tuples in the two
tables are linked if they belong to the same QI-group in T .
Hence we can publish two tables: (1) one table, called non-
sensitive table (NSS table), containing all the non-sensitive
attributes together with QI-group IDs in T , and (2) the other
table, called sensitive table (SS table), containing the QI-
group ID and the sensitive attributes. The released tables
are annotated with the remark that each tuple in each of
the two published table corresponds to one record in the
original single table. This is to ensure that a user will not
mistakenly join the two tables and assume that the join result
corresponds to the original table.
The schema of the non-sensitive table (NSS table) and
the sensitive table (SS table) are shown in Table VII and IX,
where Group ID corresponds to QI-group ID. An example is
shown in Table VI and VIII. The following theorem proves
that the resulting table indeed satisfies the p-sensitive k-
anonymity property.
Theorem 1: The resulting published tables NSS and SS
satisfy p-sensitive k-anonymity property.
Proof: Given the QI information of individuals in a table
TI (which we assume that an attacker may possess) and the
anonymous Table TA (e.g. Table IV). We can “join” the two
tables by matching each QI in TA to its anonymous QI-
group and obtain a table TIA. Since TA satisfies p-sensitive
k-anonymity, when the QI values of an individual is linked
to a set S of values in the sensitive attribute, at least k   1
other QI’s values of other individuals are also linked to S.
In addition, distinct sensitive values in S are at least p.
Now, suppose the adversary is given tables NSS and SS.
Equipped with only table TI , an adversary must join the
tables NSS and SS on their common attribute in an attempt
to link the QI’s values to the sensitive values. Let the join
result be table T 0A, such as Table X. Consider any QI-group
with group ID X . Let SX be the set of sensitive values
that X is linked to in TA and suppose there are a tuples in
TA belonging to X . In Table T 0A, there will be p
2 tuples
generated for X and SX becomes S0X and each entry in SX
is duplicated p times in S0X . In the p
2 tuples in T 0A, each
original QI’s values in the given table T will now be linked
to the set S0X . Besides, p individuals are involved in X , and
each is linked to SX . The number of different sensitive value
in S0X is the same as that in SX in TIA. Hence, the tables
NSS and SS release no more information as the table TA in
terms of the linkage of an individual to a set S of sensitive
values and in terms of the number of distinct sensitive values
in S.
This shows that the privacy protection provided by the sin-
gle anonymous table TA is no stronger than that provided by
the NSS and SS tables in terms of p-sensitive k-anonymity.
Since TA satisfies p-sensitive k-anonymity, tables NSS and
SS also satisfy p-sensitive k-anonymity. 
For better understanding, the example shown in Tables
IV to X demonstrates the ideas of the proof above. If we
publish Tables VI and VIII, we can achieve similar privacy
preservation objectives as we publish Table IV only.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
This section empirically evaluates the effectiveness and
efficiency of the anatomy approach for p-sensitive k-
anonymity. We first clarify the settings of our experi-
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Figure 2: Query accuracy vs.
the number of QI d
Figure 3: Query accuracy vs.
query dimensionality qd
Figure 4: Query accuracy vs.
expected sensitivity s
Figure 5: Query accuracy vs.
parameter p
ments. Then, we compare anatomy with two other existing
anonymization methods in terms of their effectiveness for
data analysis and computation cost.
Experiment Setup: We adopted the adult data set for the
experiment, which can be downloaded in the UCIrvine
Machine Learning Repository2. We eliminated the records
with unknown values in this data set. The resulting data set
contains 45,222 tuples. Nine of the attributes were chosen
in our experiments, as shown in Table XI. From adult
dataset, we create a set of microtables, in order to examine
the influence of dimensionality. The set contains 5 tables,
denoted as adult-3,    , adult-7, respectively. Specifically,
adult-d (3  d  7) treats the first d attributes in Table
XI as the QI-attributes, and the attribute Occupation as
the sensitive attribute As. For example, adult-4 is 5D, and
contains QI-attributes Age, Work Class, Education, Martial
Status and the sensitive attribute Occupation. Furthermore,
to study the impact of cardinality, we generate multiple
versions of each adult-d with various cardinalities n, by
randomly sampling n tuples from the whole adult-d with
45,222 tuples.
Attribute Distinct Values Generalization Height
Age 74 5-,1-,20-year ranges 4
Work Class 7 Taxonomy Tree 3
Education 16 Taxonomy Tree 4
Martial Status 7 Taxonomy Tree 3
Race 5 Taxonomy Tree 2
Sex 2 Suppression 1
Native Country 41 Taxonomy Tree 3
Salary Class 2 Suppression 1
Occupation 14 Taxonomy Tree 2
Table XI: Features of Adult Data
We implemented our proposed algorithm, the p-sensitive
k-anonymity based privacy preservation by anatomy. Let us
denote it as Anatomy(p; k). We compared the proposed top-
down algorithm with the original algorithm of p-sensitive
k-anonymity [11] which generalizes the QI and forms one
generalized table only. Let us denote the algorithm by
Org(p; k). We also compare our algorithm with the state-
of-the-art algorithm in [4], which adopts multi-dimension
2http://www.ics.uci.edu/mlearn/MLRepository.html.
recoding. We denote it as Multi(p; k). Recall that each QI
value is generalized and the last two columns of Table XI
describes how these QI attributes are generalized.
By default, we set p = 2; k = 20. For adult-d tables, p
distributes from 2 to 10, and k ranges from 5 to 30. The
utility of an anonymization technique is evaluated in terms
of effectiveness for aggregate queries. The effectiveness of
aggregate query is defined to be its average relative error in
answering a query of the following form.
SELECT COUNT(*)
FROM Unknown-Microdata
WHERE pred(Aqi1 ) AND    AND pred(Aqiqd) AND pred(As)
In the above query, Unknown-Microdata is an original
data set or an anonymized data set. The query dimensionality
qd denotes the number of QI attributes to be queried and As
denotes the sensitive attribute. For instance, if the microdata
is adult-3 and qd = 2, then fAqi1 ; Aqi2 g is a random 2-sized
subset of fAge, Work Class, Educationg. For any attribute
A, the predicate pred(A) has the form (A = x1 OR A = X2
OR A = xb), where xi is a random value in the domain of
A, for 1  i  b. The value of b depends on the expected
query selectivity s: b = djAj  s1=(qd+1)e, where jAj is the
domain size of A. If the value of s is set higher, the selection
conditions in pred(A) will be more.
We compare the anonymized tables generated by different
algorithms in terms of average relative error, which is
defined as follows. We perform the aggregate query with
the original data set, called Original. That is,
SELECT COUNT(*)
FROM Original
WHERE pred(Aqi1 ) AND    AND pred(Aqiqd) AND pred(As)
Let us call the count obtained above act. We execute the
aggregate query with the anonymized data set as follows.
As algorithm Anatomy(p; k) generates two tables, namely
NSS and SS, we perform the query as follows.
SELECT COUNT(*)
FROM SS
WHERE SS.Group ID in (SELECT NSS.Group ID FROM NSS,
WHERE pred(Aqi1 ) AND    AND pred(Aqiqd) AND pred(As))
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Figure 6: Query accuracy vs.
parameter k
Figure 7: Query accuracy vs.
dataset cardinality n
Figure 8: Running time vs.
dataset cardinality n
Figure 9: Running time vs. pa-
rameter p
Let us call the count obtained above est. As algorithms
Org(p; k) and Multi(p; k) generate one anonymized table,
we perform the first query by replacing Unknown-Microdata
with the anonymized or generalized data. Then, we define
the relative error to be jact estj=act, where act is its actual
count derived from the original, and est the estimated count
computed from the anonymized table.
Table XII summarizes the parameters of our experimen-






number of QI-attributes d 3,4,5,6,7
query dimensionality qd 1,2,   ,d
expected sensitivity s 0.25%,0.5%,1%,2%,4%
Table XII: Parameter and tested values
Effectiveness of data analysis: This section compares
alternative solutions on their accuracy in count analysis. The
first set of experiments examines the effects of d. Figure 2
plots the error of all methods as a function of d, for datasets
adult-d. From the Figure 2, we can see that Anatomy(p; k)
gives a lower average relative error compared with the other
two algorithms Org(p; k), Multi(p; k). This is because
algorithm Anatomy(p; k) does not generalize the table
but algorithm Org(p; k) generalize the table, which makes
the average relative error higher, and its accuracy decays
severely as the dimensionality increases, which confirm the
analysis in [1].
Next, we examine alternative techniques on queries in-
volving different number qd of QI-attributes. Figure 3
demonstrates the results for adult-5. Again, the error of
anatomy is consistently small, whereas generalization-based
approaches are again the worst techniques. Figure 4 present
the error as a function of query selectivity s. It can be
found that the average relative error of all three algorithms
decreases when s increases. This is because, when s is larger,
each attribute in the aggregate query involves more value
matches. That means the actual count is larger. Note that the
actual count is the denominator of the average relative error.
Besides, if the generalized values in the anonymized table
match more aggregate values in the query, the estimated
count will be more accurate. Thus, the overall average
relative error decreases when s increases.
Figure 5 examines the accuracy as p varies. As expected,
the error of anatomy-based and generalization-based in-
creases with p, because more data distortion is needed in
order to enforce stronger privacy control. Similar results are
plotted by varying k in Figure 6. Finally, Figure 7 presents
the results under different dataset cardinalities n. We found
that the average relative error of all three algorithms de-
creases slightly when n increases. This is because, when n
is larger, there is more chance that a tuple can be matched
with an existing tuple in the data without much general-
ization. Similarly, algorithm Anatomy(p; k) gives a lower
average relative error compared with algorithm Org(p; k)
and Multi(p; k). The effectiveness of each method remains
fairly stable at all cardinalities.
Efficiency of the algorithms: Having tested the effec-
tiveness of anatomy-based approach for data analysis, we
proceed to evaluate its efficiency. Figure 8 compares the time
of anonymization required by Anatomy(p; k), Org(p; k)
andMulti(p; k) on the dataset with different cardinalities n.
The computing overhead of Anatomy(p; k) is less than the
other two generalization-based approaches, since there is no
generalization cost. Similar results are shown in Figure 9,
where the the experiments are carried out shows by varying
k for all three algorithms.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a p-sensitive k-anonymity
based privacy preservation mechanism that reduce informa-
tion loss by the anatomy approach. Instead of publishing
one generalized table, we generate two tables with a sharing
attribute called Group ID, which corresponds to a unique
identifier of a “QI-group”. One table contains the detailed
information of the quasi-identifier and Group ID, and the
other table contains Group ID and the sensitive attribute.
By avoiding the generalization of the quasi-identifier in the
first table, we achieve less information loss. We conducted
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extensive experiments and verified the improvement on
effectiveness on data analysis and efficiency in execution
time.
This work also initiates several directions for future in-
vestigation. For example, in this article, we focused on the
case where there is a single sensitive attribute; extending
our technique to multiple sensitive attributes is an interesting
topic. Another direction is to apply this permutation-based
approach to other privacy principles, and make compre-
hensive experimental studies to show its effectiveness and
efficiency.
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